The End of the Illusion in Haiti: What Comes After February 7?

By Ronald Sanders

February 7 is more than just a date on Haiti’s political calendar – it’s a marker of the collapse of an experiment that was doomed from the outset.

The expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate extinguished whatever illusion remained that this cumbersome nine-member body could steer the nation away from chaos. From the beginning, the Council faced skepticism verging on contempt.

Haitians recognized it for what it was: a fractured, insular mechanism driven by rivalry, corruption, and personal ambition. They foresaw its failure – and they were right.

A Mandate Unfulfilled

The Council has failed on every measure of its own mandate. Security remains elusive. Daily life for ordinary Haitians has not improved. Elections that would restore constitutional governance are nowhere on the horizon.

To be fair, there have been limited security gains. Haitian police operations, backed by international partners, have scored tactical victories against gang violence.

But tactical improvements cannot mask strategic failure. Security advances, while necessary, cannot substitute for constitutional legitimacy or political coherence.

They are nowhere near sufficient.

Political disunity – Haiti’s most stubborn affliction – has reasserted itself even as the country descends deeper into violence and humanitarian catastrophe. The verdict is now clear: both within Haiti and among international partners, there is broad consensus that the Council’s mandate ends on February 7 and must not be extended through political maneuvering or improvisation.

Caribbean leaders have repeatedly warned against eleventh-hour destabilization and manufactured crises timed to the mandate’s expiration. The United Nations Security Council, in renewing its political mission in Haiti, has emphasized the centrality of national dialogue, accountability, and elections.

A February 2 consultative meeting convened by Albert Ramdin, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, brought together two CARICOM foreign ministers and representatives from the United Nations, Canada, and the United States.

Despite reported differences, they reached a common position. Though participation was limited, the message was widely shared: Haiti needs predictable governance, credible security, timely elections, and – the persistent hope – a Haitian-led solution.

No More Alibis

This consensus strips away a familiar excuse. The Transitional Council’s failure is not the result of foreign interference. It is the consequence of internal misconduct.

That harsh reality was articulated with moral authority by Edmonde Supplice Beauzile, a former parliamentarian, party leader, and serious presidential contender in 2016. Speaking as a committed citizen rather than a factional player, she warned that Haiti suffers less from lack of diagnosis than from collective refusal to accept treatment.

Her plea was not for another council or political document, but for civic courage – for leaders willing, even briefly, to place country above personal ambition.

As February 7 approached, fears mounted that some Council members might resist departure. The appearance of U.S. warships offshore heightened those concerns.

Publicly, the deployment was framed as part of a broader counter-trafficking and regional security operation; politically, it carried unmistakable deterrent symbolism. Yet informed voices inside Haiti – including former senior officials and civil society leaders – remain confident that no constituency will mobilize to preserve the Council or provoke American intervention.

What Comes After

That assessment found support from Pierre Esperance, Executive Director of Haiti’s leading human rights organization. Esperance had expected all Transitional Council members to leave office on February 7.

In the absence of an agreed replacement framework, he observed that the Prime Minister should have remained in place solely to manage routine administration—an outcome that amounted to a third consecutive transition rather than a resolution of the crisis.

Crucially, Esperance had insisted that continuity must not slide into rule by decree. Any interim arrangement, he argued, had to be bounded by a defined roadmap for governance, security, and elections, and constrained by independent oversight in the absence of a legislature.

That oversight—drawn from Haiti’s own audit, financial intelligence, and anti-corruption institutions—was to review public expenditures, test legality, and publicly flag abuse. Its function was supervisory, not executive: to constrain discretion, deter misuse, and preserve the temporary character of authority.

February 7 closed the Council’s mandate. It also closed the benefit of the doubt.

Transitions are judged by outcomes, not intentions. On security, governance, unity, and elections, the Transitional Presidential Council failed to deliver.

In law and in fact, its authority has ended. It must go.

But concentrating all governing authority in the Prime Minister alone is neither reasonable nor constitutional. However capable or committed he may be to Haiti’s recovery, there must be a governing structure that aligns more closely with Haiti’s constitutional order.

A Constitutional Alternative

A more defensible path exists. Haiti’s Constitution locates executive authority not in the Prime Minister acting alone, but in the Government acting collectively through the Cabinet, which the Prime Minister chairs (Articles 155–158).

That structure – long understood within Haiti – serves as a constitutional check on rule by decree and provides the lawful basis for interim collective governance pending elections. It is an important consideration seldom acknowledged by external actors who shape Haiti’s political arrangements.

Authority vested in the Cabinet, exercised for a strictly limited period, subject to oversight by civil society and the private sector, and anchored to an irreversible commitment to elections, would tie power to collective responsibility. Civil society oversight would provide review of proposed decisions and prevent unchecked discretion.

It is not elegant – but neither was the Transitional Council, nor would governance by prime ministerial decree be. Collective Cabinet authority, with independent review, is proportionate to this moment in Haiti’s troubled history.

Matching Words with Action

Haitian actors must now govern with restraint and accountability. At the same time, the international community – led by the United Nations, working in concert with CARICOM and key bilateral partners – must match political expectations with operational support.

What comes next for Haiti must mean sustained action on security, and timely resources to begin addressing the nation’s long-neglected social and economic needs: basic services, livelihoods, food security, and institutional capacity. Without that parallel commitment, interim governance will be asked to carry burdens no transition can bear – and the cycle of failure will simply resume under a different name.

The illusion has ended. The question now is whether Haiti’s leaders – and its international partners – can summon the courage and commitment to build something real in its place.

Ronald Sanders is Antigua & Barbuda’s Ambassador to the US and the OAS