South Africa’s Migrant Burden

By Gregory Simpkins

Since majority rule began in 1994, South Africa has become the main migration destination in Africa. It’s as though Africa were a board game lifted up so pieces from all over slid down to the bottom. The numbers cited here come from Stats South Africa, censuses and UN estimates.

According to the 2022 census, about 2.4 million total immigrants lived in South Africa. The vast majority are from other African countries. The UN estimated in 2020 that 2.86 million foreign-born people total lived in South Africa, again with most from Africa. Stats SA doesn’t publish a single “since 1994” cumulative total because migration is measured as “stock” – people living there at census time, not lifetime inflows. But we can see the shift by comparing censuses.

Based on Census 2001, 2011, 2022 and UN 2020 data, nearly 96 percent come from seven immigrant source countries:

• Zimbabweans, comprising 48.5 percent of immigrants at about 1.16 million immigrants, up from 690,243 in 2020.
• Mozambicans, comprising 20 percent at about 480,000, up from 350,463 in 2020.
• Basotho (people from Lesotho) comprising 10.9 percent at about 262,000, up from 192,008 in 2020.
• Malawians, comprising 9.5 percent at about 228,000, up from 94,119 in 2020.
• Ethiopians, comprising 2.8 percent at about 67,000, up from 44,181 in 2020.
• Nigerians, comprising 1.2 percent at about 29,000, down from 36,210 in 2020
• Zambians, comprising 1.2 percent at about 29,000, up from 22,901 in 2020

Other Source Countries and Regional Migration Patterns

Other African source countries have been the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Angola, Eswatini, Botswana, the Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and Egypt.

The biggest shift post-1994 is Zimbabwean migration, especially after Zimbabwe’s economic crisis in the 2000s. Mozambican migration was high in the 1980s-1990s due to the RENAMO War, then declined in share.

Most migrants are from neighboring Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries: Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, driven by mine labor in much of the pre-1994 and 1980s migration.

There have been high numbers of refugees/asylum seekers from Somalia, the DR Congo and Ethiopia. Somalia alone had 58,491 in South Africa by 2020.

These are stock numbers – people living in South Africa at each census. Cumulative arrivals since 1994 would be higher because some migrants left, died or gained citizenship. Stats SA’s Migration Profile Report 2023 is the main official source for the country breakdowns.

Immigrant Financial Burden Not as Onerous as Imagined

The direct financial burden of refugees/asylum seekers on South Africa’s budget is tiny compared to social grants for poor South Africans. That’s because South Africa law bars asylum seekers from most social grants and the asylum system itself is underfunded.

South Africa’s asylum policy is “non-encampment” – no UN High Commission for Refugees-run camps. Asylum seekers must self-support. The 2017 Refugees Amendment Act even removed the automatic right to work while claims are processed. Only those who prove they are unable to sustain themselves can get work rights after 6 months.

UNHCR gave 147 million rands (US$8.82 million) in 2021 to help clear the appeals backlog. That funding was for four years. But the Refugee Appeals Authority of South Africa (RAASA) had staff drop from 30 to 10 by 2024. In 2025 it finalized only 4,475 appeals, with more than 113,000 cases still pending. Critics say RAASA funding cuts left it without a sustainable plan.

Deportations cost about 50 million rand (US$3 million) in 2025/26. That year 57,784 people were deported, up 46 percent from 2023/24. The Border Management Authority intercepted more than 450,000 people attempting illegal entry in the past year.

The South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) got 8.69 billion rand (US$521 million) voted in funding for 2021/22, with total expenditure 9.3 billion rand (US$558 million) in 2020/21 then dropping to 8.9 billion rand (US$534 million) in 2023/24, but most DHA spending is on IDs, passports and immigration services for all categories, not just asylum. The baseline was cut 3.2 billion rand (US$192 million) over the medium term, hitting staff capacity.

Why the Social Grants Comparison Doesn’t Hold Up

Asylum seekers and refugees are excluded from South Africa’s social grants system – no Child Support Grant, Old Age Pension, Disability Grant or the Social Relief of Distress (SRD) R350 grant (US$21) – It was increased to 370 rand (US$22.20) per month in April 2024. Only South African citizens and permanent residents qualify. So the welfare burden argument doesn’t apply to direct cash transfers.

In the 2024/25 budget, the National Treasury allocated 266.21 billion rand (US$15.98 million) to social grants, covering about 18 million beneficiaries.

Social grants are about 5,000x larger than the deportation budget. Even if you counted all DHA spending of 8.9 billion rand as refugee-related – which it isn’t – social grants would still be 30x bigger.

Refugees/asylum seekers use clinics, schools, hospitals. These are funded from general tax revenue. No official estimate exists of the cost, but South Africa’s policy is integration, not camps, so it’s spread across provincial budgets. Asylum seekers who work pay income tax, Value Added Tax and make Unemployment Insurance Fund contributions.

Because work rights are restricted, many are informal. DHA’s 2017 Act made it harder to work legally.

The 113,000-case appeals backlog means people remain in legal limbo for years. That creates administrative costs but also means delayed integration/exit.

The measurable financial burden of refugees/asylum seekers is deportations of about 50 million rand (US$3 million)/year plus a share of DHA’s administrative budget. They don’t receive social grants. The financial burden of supporting poor South Africans through grants is 266 billion rand (US$15.96 million)/year, serving 18 million people.

So the direct budget impact of refugees is significantly less than the size of social grant spending. The real debates in South Africa are about competition for jobs, pressure on clinics/schools in some areas and border management – not direct welfare costs, because refugees aren’t eligible for grants.

Xenophobia Despite the Facts

Even though the figures show that poor South Africans aren’t being significantly disadvantaged by the many immigrants to their country, there has been longstanding unrest concerning the perceived burden of immigrants. Actually, the issue is the job displacement from more educated foreigners, especially Zimbabweans.

Nevertheless, the evidence from multiple studies and Stats SA data shows immigrants in South Africa don’t cause net job losses for South Africans overall – the effect is small and mixed, with some job creation and some competition in specific sectors. A World Bank 2018 study using 1996-2011 census data showed that one immigrant worker generated approximately two jobs for local residents in South Africa.

Overall, immigration has either a very small positive effect on South African employment, or none at all. A 1 percent increase in the immigrant share predicts a 0.003 percent to 0.01 percent increase in employment of South Africans – essentially negligible.

Therefore, foreigners do not harm the average employment chances of locals – at least according to the census data. They often do different jobs and complementary tasks, leading to productivity gains. Many immigrants are entrepreneurs who create their own jobs or have higher skills than many South Africans.

Still, as pan-African business leader Emeka Ajene pointed out in a recent post on LinkedIn, research from the South African Social Attitudes Survey and other studies show that Nigerians consistently face the highest levels of hostility of any migrant group in South Africa – routinely scapegoated for drug peddling, human trafficking and financial fraud, allegations that reduce a community of traders, entrepreneurs and professionals to a criminal caricature. Nigeria is moving citizens out of South Africa to escape being targeted.

Yet Nigeria and South Africa consistently account for a quarter to a third of Africa’s economic output, Ajene states. Their complementary strengths – Nigeria’s 240 million people and cultural soft power, South Africa’s deep financial markets, industrial capacity and G-20 and BRICS memberships – make them the continent’s most consequential bilateral partnership.

A Widening Pattern of Hostility

Other countries, such as Ghana, are recently moving their citizens out of South Africa to safeguard them against xenophobic violence. In 2026, South Africa has witnessed a surge in xenophobic violence, particularly in cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban. Vigilante groups, including the citizen-led movement March and March, have carried out attacks on foreign nationals, looting businesses, destroying property and preventing migrants from accessing healthcare and education.

Recent reports indicate that there were at least five deaths and hundreds displaced, with victims including long-term residents like Princess Adjei, a Ghanaian who had lived in South Africa since childhood.

The anti-foreigner violence has become so egregious that even the outspoken Julius Malema, leader of the black nationalist Economic Freedom Fighters political party, has of late been appealing to his fellow South Africans to stop attacking immigrants from other African countries and reminding them of the need to “uphold human dignity and the rule of law.”

At governmental levels, African countries are able to get along, but at local levels for example, indigenous shopkeepers in South Africa have long objected to losing business to immigrant businesspeople. They don’t have the luxury of focusing on the continent-wide picture.

In my travels to South Africa over the years, I have witnessed immigrant stores in the Soweto area, for example, attacked and burned down – allegedly by thugs hired by South African shopkeepers resisting immigrant competition.

So just as poor and middle-class South Africans disregard the statistics presented on the impact of immigration on their lives, so too will African governments react negatively to the xenophobia demonstrated within the country. The actions by countries such as Nigeria and Ghana to remove their citizens from South Africa for their protection caries a reputational cost for South Africa among their citizenry that can’t help but eventually impact their governments’ policies toward South Africa.

Consider this an after-effect of apartheid, which disadvantaged black South Africans for decades and left the feeling that any foreigners who arrive take the benefits so many fought hard and died to receive. The facts may show otherwise, but ingrained feelings passed between generations are resistant to statistics.

Before more intra-African reputational damage is done, South Africa and its fellow African governments must effectively address this situation – among them and among their respective citizenry – as soon as possible.

Gregory Simpkins, a longtime specialist in African policy development, is the Principal of 21st Century Solutions. He consults with organizations on African policy issues generally, especially in relating to the U.S. Government. He further acts as a consultant to the African Merchants Association, where he advises the Association in its efforts to stimulate an increase in trade between several hundred African Diaspora small and medium enterprises and their African partners.