Examining Sudan’s complex conflict

By Gregory Simpkins

The current conflict in Sudan is the result of unintended consequences of a previous ruler’s protection scheme, a struggle for power and control by competing military leaders, and the influence of outside forces. Unfortunately, as if the conflict in the country isn’t bad enough, it already is spilling over into neighboring states and threatens to have even broader negative impacts than it does already.

Since the country’s 2018–19 revolution and the military coup that followed: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), have jointly taken advantage of the vacuum left by their deposing of former President Omar al-Bashir. The two forces jointly overthrew Bashir and then derailed the country’s democratic transition, sidelining the civilian transitional government in October 2021 and then resisting international pressure to resolve their differences and hand power to a new civilian administration last month.

Ironically, it was Bashir who established the Janjaweed militia to attack non-Arab residents of Darfur who rebelled against the government in Khartoum in 2013. Bashir’s government attempted to regularize the Janjaweed as the RSF, providing them with weapons and vehicles and using them later to patrol the border with Libya and round up Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in response to the Khartoum process, an initiative between European and African states, including Sudan, to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. Bashir was said to have counted on the Janjaweed to protect him from being overthrown by his own military as previous Sudanese leaders had been.

During the War in Darfur, in 2014 and 2015, the RSF “repeatedly attacked villages, burned and looted homes, beating, raping and executing villagers,” aided by air and ground support from the Sudanese Armed Forces. According to Human Rights Watch, the RSF executions and rapes typically took place in villages after rebels had left. The attacks were systematic enough to qualify as crimes against humanity, the organization stated.

Sudan became independent in 1956, but a series of military coups put the army in control for decades as the military became increasingly involved in politics. A mere two years after independence, the army’s two senior generals, Major General Ibrahim Abboud, the armed forces commander, and Ahmad Abd al Wahab, seized power in a military coup. President Abboud was forced to step down in 1964 following demonstrations during the first Sudanese civil war.

On May 25, 1969, several young officers, led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry, seized power and brought the army into political control for the second time. From 1969 until 1971, a military government – the National Revolutionary Command Council, composed of 9 young officers and one civilian, exercised authority over a largely civilian cabinet. The second Sudanese civil war broke out in 1982, and Bashir seized power in a 1989 coup, holding power until deposed by the current competing military forces.

Thus, an activated Sudanese military had acquired a taste for political power that apparently has become too tempting to relinquish. The only question is which element will claim ultimate authority – the regular military or the former militia forces considered by the army to be ill-trained and undisciplined. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament placed the RSF directly under the command of Bashir. They have refused to integrate into the SAF, even after their patron was overthrown partly by them.

If regional actors become deeply involved, it will become much more difficult to contain the conflict, given the multiple interests any potential settlement will have to satisfy.

Foreign Affairs magazine has reported that the lower ranks of the SAF despise their RSF counterparts because they received higher salaries and better equipment, while RSF soldiers resented being seen as an illegitimate and inferior force. A 29 April Jamestown Foundation report stated that many Darfur Arabs, who comprise the RSF’s base, dislike the Khartoum ruling class, which consists mostly of members of Sudan’s powerful northern Nile-based Arab tribes, who have controlled the country since independence in 1956: the Ja’alin, the Danagla, and the Sha’iqiya (al-Bashir is Ja’alin, al-Burhan is Sha’iqiya). The riverine Arabs, in turn, regard the Darfur Arabs as backwards and “Africanized.”

Al-Burhan dissolved the RSF on April 17 and labeled it a “rebel” movement, adding that the matter is an internal one that does not require interference from the international community. There are, however, questions regarding al-Burhan’s legal authority to dissolve the RSF, reports Radio Dabanga. Meanwhile, Hemedti has accused the SAF of staging another coup.

In this struggle, outside forces have weighed in to place their bets on whichever side they feel suits their interests. Egypt reportedly has sent weapons to the SAF, and the Libyan militia leader Khalifa Haftar, a fellow client of the United Arab Emirates, is said to have restocked the RSF. Foreign Affairs is reporting that the traditional population centers of Hemedti’s Rizeigat tribe span the border between Sudan and Chad, and the larger Baggara confederation that includes the Rizeigat inhabits lands as far west as Niger in the Sahel. Governments and militant leaders throughout this region could be drawn into the conflict. Sudan also could become a battleground in the still unresolved confrontation between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Renaissance Dam. If regional actors become deeply involved, it will become much more difficult to contain the conflict, given the multiple interests any potential settlement will have to satisfy.

According to “sources”, the Russian mercenary Wagner Group has been supplying the RSF with missiles to aid their fight against the country’s army, Sudanese and regional diplomatic sources have told CNN. The sources said the surface-to-air missiles have significantly buttressed RSF paramilitary fighters. Al Araby TV has reported a connection between the Wagner Group and Hemedti. Leaked documents and sources reportedly indicate that the Wagner Group has provided training and equipment, including armored vehicles and helicopter gunships, to Hemedti’s forces. The Russian company is alleged to have provided security services during Hemedti’s visit to Russia in 2018.

Joining existing U.S. sanctions, European Union sanctions were imposed in March on Russian company M-Invest and its subsidiary Sudan Meroe Gold, which are mining companies tied to the Wagner Group, for illegally trading in gold “looted by force from local traders”, reported the Sudan Tribune on 2 March. In March of last year, an executive with a Sudanese gold mine informed The Telegraph that Russia was smuggling 30 tonnes of gold from Sudan every year to build its reserves and weaken the effects of sanctions imposed on Russia for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Sudan is now the third-largest gold producer in Africa. However, as much as 80 percent of production is smuggled out of the country, and much of it is to Russia.

There is concern in South Sudan that the Sudanese conflict will spill over and upset the very fragile peace there. Moreover, South Sudan’s oil flows through Sudan to foreign off-takers, and the conflict threatens the largest source of income for South Sudan, not to mention potentially sending increasing numbers of Sudanese fleeing south.

The U.N. refugee agency reports more than 100,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to neighboring countries since fighting erupted between the SAF and the RSF on April 15. Aid agencies are gearing up for what is expected to be a massive exodus of more than 800,000 refugees and returnees fleeing for safety from war-torn Sudan to neighboring countries at a time when U.N. humanitarian agencies and partners are facing a severe funding shortage.

“As of this morning (May 2), the US$1.75 billion joint appeal for Sudan in 2023 is only 14 percent funded,” said Jens Laerke, spokesman for the Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “In other words, U.N. humanitarian agencies and our partners are facing a funding gap of US$1.5 billion.”

This latest Sudan conflict has been a long time developing, and the outside world is at odds over what to do about it. Some in the international community seek to benefit from the conflict while other elements would like to end the fighting and prevent an even wider humanitarian crisis that they are ill-equipped to address effectively.

This is a situation created by the Sudanese, even though outsiders have involved themselves, but the Sudanese alone will not be sufficient to resolve it. Getting the international community on the same page, though, seems highly unlikely at this point. That means the conflict unfortunately has no signs of ending soon despite all the peace agreements that are drafted and signed.

Gregory Simpkins, a longtime specialist in African policy development, is the Principal of 21st Century Solutions. He consults with organizations on African policy issues generally, especially in relating to the U.S. Government. He also serves as Managing Director for the Morganthau Stirling consulting firm, where he oversees program development and implementation. He further acts as a consultant to the African Merchants Association, where he advises the Association in its efforts to stimulate an increase in trade between several hundred African Diaspora small and medium enterprises and their African partners.