Who Speaks for Haiti? The Trouble With a “Haitian-Led Solution”

By Ronald Sanders

Who speaks for Haiti? The international community can no longer avoid the question.

For years, governments and international organizations have insisted that Haiti’s deepening crisis demands a “Haitian-led solution.” The principle is sound: Haitians must determine their country’s future. But the phrase is wearing thin. There is little evidence of a political process legitimate, representative and coherent enough to deliver such a solution.

The issue is not whether the solution should be Haitian-led. It is who may legitimately claim to lead it, and on what authority.

The Gangs and the Political Class

United Nations experts have assembled mounting evidence that some people who have wielded political influence in Haiti maintained ties to the armed gangs responsible for much of the country’s devastation.

A report by the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti describes connections between armed groups and political, economic and security actors. It names former legislators allegedly involved in supporting criminal organizations, and it warns that links between gangs and political figures could be used to sway elections.

The report alleges that Alfrédo Junior Antoine, a former member of parliament, supplied weapons, ammunition and money to armed groups, and that Nenel Cassy, a former senator, backed armed men to advance his political interests. Both deny the allegations. The experts caution that politicians with historical gang connections may exploit them to rally support, intimidate opponents and shape electoral outcomes.

These claims demand investigation and due process. Their broader significance, however, is unmistakable: Haiti’s criminal organizations do not operate apart from the country’s political and economic life. Gangs have been used to seize territory, protect commercial interests, silence opponents and accumulate influence.

The question, then, is not simply how Haiti can defeat its gangs. It is how the country can build legitimate government when networks that have exercised political influence are implicated in sustaining criminal power.

What Haitians Actually Want

A Chatham House study published in August 2026 confronts the difficulty head-on. Its authors note that diplomats routinely call for Haitian leadership without answering which Haitians should supply it.

The study, based on interviews with 1,332 Haitian adults in May, captures both what ordinary Haitians want and how they judge their political class:

• Trust is scarce. More than 75 percent of respondents have little or no trust in politicians. Just 2.9 percent trust them a great deal.
• Democracy is not the problem. Nearly 90 percent consider elections important to Haiti’s future, and 82.9 percent want them held in 2026 or 2027.
• Impunity is unwelcome. Some 83.4 percent oppose allowing gang members or leaders to hold government posts, and 66.9 percent reject amnesty for members of armed groups.

Haitians, in other words, have not given up on democracy, legitimate government or accountability. What they distrust is a political class that has failed to deliver. Disagreement among politicians should not be mistaken for an absence of national aspiration. Nor does a deal among rival political interests become “Haitian-led” merely because its signatories are Haitian.

An Election in Doubt

The electoral timetable is now in question. Presidential and legislative elections had been scheduled for December 13, 2026. The Provisional Electoral Council has since extended candidate registration to October 31, postponed the campaign calendar and signaled that a revised schedule is coming.

Even if a new date is announced, the harder questions remain. Who will control the political process? Will criminal organizations, or their sponsors, influence the outcome?

The Danger of Donor Fatigue

International fatigue poses another threat. Progress remains painfully limited, and other conflicts, economic pressures and security priorities compete for attention and money.

If outside engagement flags, ordinary Haitians will pay the price. Those who profit from weapons and drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, territorial control and diverted public funds will not. Political and economic actors who benefit from feeble institutions have no appetite for independent courts, accountable policing or transparent administration.

Haiti must not be abandoned because its politicians cannot agree. That would leave the population to bear the consequences of failures for which ordinary citizens bear little responsibility. Equally, international aid cannot mean bankrolling one transitional arrangement after another without clear obligations, measurable results and accountability.

Redefining Haitian Ownership

Haitian ownership must be preserved, but its meaning must be made precise.

It should mean backing institutions with lawful mandates, transparency and public accountability. Participation must reach beyond political factions to civil society, community organizations, women and young people, professional and religious bodies, and legitimate private-sector representatives.

It should mean listening to the Haitian people, whose priorities the Chatham House study helps illuminate. And it should mean investigating the networks the UN experts identified, enforcing sanctions, interrupting weapons supplies, and ensuring that anyone credibly implicated in serious crimes faces independent judicial scrutiny.

The Gang Suppression Force and the Haitian National Police need the resources to protect communities, alongside the judicial and administrative institutions without which security gains cannot last. The Chatham House survey reveals understandable caution here: 49.5 percent of respondents support the Force’s presence, but 54.2 percent doubt it can accomplish its mission. That skepticism strengthens the case for adequate funding, clear objectives, measurable performance and accountability.

None of this requires foreign governments to pick Haiti’s leaders or dictate its constitutional future. That would undermine the very sovereignty international assistance is meant to protect. But sovereignty cannot become an excuse, inside Haiti, to ignore criminal influence, institutional failure or the lack of accountable leadership.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of American States (OAS) bear a particular responsibility to insist on this distinction. Their engagement should widen Haitian participation and strengthen institutions capable of earning public confidence.

A Right that Belongs to Haitians

Haiti’s tragedy is not that its people lack a desire for democracy. It is that the institutions meant to express their wishes have been hollowed out, while armed groups and their associates have gained extraordinary power.

“Haitian-led solution” should never be abandoned as a principle. But neither Haitian political actors nor international partners should invoke it as a substitute for confronting the realities that have repeatedly kept such a solution from becoming legitimate, meaningful and durable.

A genuinely Haitian-led solution requires more than agreement among political factions. It demands an inclusive national process, transparent and time-bound transitional arrangements, the exclusion of criminal influence, stronger public institutions and credible elections in which Haitians can freely choose their leaders. International partners should support that process with security, resources and technical assistance, while insisting on accountability and measurable progress.

The Haitian people have the right to determine their future. The task now is to make sure that right belongs to them, and not to the gangs or those who sustain them.

Ronald Sanders is Antigua & Barbuda’s Ambassador to the US and the OAS, and the Chancellor of The University of Guyana