AGOA: More Political Than Economic

By Gregory Simpkins

I was associated with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for several years before it became law in 2000. It was intended to encourage economic fairness and openness for American firms in African countries in return for greater African access to the U.S. market. There has always been an element of concern over human rights in AGOA recipient nations, but initially it focused on how human rights issues affected trade conditions, such as worker safety and rights. I was involved in those early discussions on the role of human rights in the trade process.

Yet the program has become increasingly concerned with threats to American national security interests, diplomatic leverage on foreign policy issues, and even foreign adherence to domestic beliefs. Recent judgments on AGOA eligibility seem to have been more about assessments of how African governments conduct their domestic affairs.

Currently, there is growing concern over the expulsion of African recipients for reasons only partly related to their trade practices. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that an annual interagency review found that South Africa and Rwanda are engaging in practices inconsistent with the program’s eligibility criteria. As economic analyst and JC Holdings CEO Mark-Anthony Johnson wrote in a recent LinkedIn blog post, this decision cuts both countries off from duty-free access to the US$33 trillion U.S. market, delivering a major economic blow to their respective export sectors.

South Africa Under Scrutiny

Johnson pointed out that the U.S. government cited several key factors for stripping South Africa, the program’s largest overall beneficiary, of its eligibility. The Trump administration, he said, cited trade and investment barriers, such as pervasive internal policies that undermine American trade and investment. National security and foreign policy have become increasingly relevant to U.S.-South Africa relations, which have frayed significantly because of South Africa’s close ties with Russia and China in the BRICS coalition, its case against Israel over the Gaza incursion at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and its domestic Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policies.

Johnson said governance concerns, including persistent state corruption and false allegations regarding the treatment of minority groups, were also factored into the final decision. As examined in earlier articles on The Habari Network and in a South Africa-focused podcast on Real Talk Habari, South Africa is the most vulnerable BRICS target as a means of punishing the group for its de-dollarization campaign to remove the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. As for the reference to minority rights violations, the Habari Network has repeatedly examined the false accusation of white genocide in South Africa.

So, while there have legitimately been longstanding trade issues between the U.S. and South Africa, other matters appear to be fueling the ongoing political and economic rift between the two nations. South Africa has until January 1, 2027, to challenge the decision before it takes effect.

The use of the bogus issue of endangered white South Africans somewhat mirrors the use of LGBTQ threats in Uganda. Whatever other reasons the Biden administration had for suspending Uganda’s AGOA access, the anti-LGBTQ law was the basis for a suspension that continues to this day. No matter how draconian this Ugandan law is on paper, there has been no proven widespread persecution of LGBTQ people in Uganda, and certainly no executions of LGBTQ people. The law seems to have been a political ploy by the government to satisfy a wing of its supporters without fully carrying out its provisions. Since its passage in 2023, almost no formal convictions have occurred.

Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Foreign Policy Leverage

As for Rwanda, there have been quite a few economic machinations, such as the appropriation of minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) for sale as Rwandan products. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has cited several categories of AGOA violations by Rwanda, including trade and investment barriers, rule of law concerns, and human rights issues. However, the main reason for suspending Rwanda’s AGOA access is its reported materiel, logistical, and even troop support for M23 rebels in the DR Congo, in violation of agreements signed with that country and the United States just last year. Defying U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict in eastern DR Congo is what led to Rwanda’s suspension.

The issues deemed offensive to U.S. national security are the very issues under mediation by the U.S. in the Washington Accords. The Accords are crafted around two core tasks:

1. The neutralization and repatriation of the armed rebel group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), will be carried out by the DR Congo
2. Lifting of defensive measures and disengagement of forces, to be carried out by Rwanda

In the Doha process, the DR Congo and M23 are working on a separate track aimed at addressing the core issues in the rebellion, in exchange for the re-establishment of sovereign control by the DR Congo in all occupied zones. Hence, the sanctions language is problematic because this is precisely what the two processes are addressing.

A similar use of AGOA as foreign policy leverage was applied against Ethiopia in 2022 for its part in the Tigray region conflict. Even though the Government of Ethiopia was only one of the actors in that conflict accused of human rights violations, it was the only state actor over which the United States held effective leverage through sanctions. Despite repeated requests to restore AGOA access as recently as this year, Ethiopia remains suspended.

How is AGOA Functioning Otherwise?

As of the beginning of November this year, AGOA has been unstable: it lapsed on September 30, 2025, was reauthorized for one year in February 2026, and was extended again on September 2, 2026, through December 31, 2028.

AGOA requires the President to convene an annual forum on trade and investment relations and AGOA implementation, typically hosted by the United States and an AGOA country in alternating years. The DR Congo was slated to host the 2025 forum, which reportedly did not take place as scheduled. There has been no AGOA Forum in 2026, either.

Which Countries Are Eligible, and Which Are Not

For the 2025-2026 review year, USTR lists 32 eligible countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Djibouti, Eswatini, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda (apparel suspended since 2018), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia.

U.S. imports from those 32 countries totaled US$31.2 billion in 2025, of which US$5.2 billion entered under AGOA preferences.

Seventeen countries are not covered: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

The rationales for excluding the 15 suspended countries (other than Uganda and Ethiopia) fall into four categories:

1. Human rights, rule of law, and coups (core AGOA criteria)

Eligibility requires rule of law, political pluralism, anti-corruption efforts, human rights, worker rights, intellectual property protection, and market access. Uganda and Ethiopia were excluded for the reasons explained earlier. As for the others:

• Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Gabon were all removed after military coups between 2021 and 2023. Coups violate the clause on unconstitutional changes of government.
• Burundi, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic have ongoing human rights or political repression concerns.
• Zimbabwe has experienced sanctions, human rights problems, and rule of law issues since AGOA’s inception and has never been eligible for its trade benefits.

2. Never requested or not reviewed

• Sudan was not reviewed for eligibility because it has not requested designation as an AGOA beneficiary country.
• Somalia first expressed interest in 2023 but has not yet been reviewed.

3. Graduated from the Generalized System of Preferences (the basis of AGOA) for being too wealthy

• Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles both graduated from the GSP because of high national income, so they are not eligible for consideration for AGOA benefits.

4. Conflict and new states

• South Sudan and Eritrea have implemented no functioning market reforms and are of serious human rights concern.

Trade Capacity Building and the Path Forward

The recent emphasis on domestic issues in African countries, and the use of AGOA as leverage on foreign policy concerns, ignores one of the program’s main functions. AGOA directs the President to provide trade capacity building (TCB) to AGOA beneficiaries. Before 2025, the U.S. Agency for International Development, which the Trump Administration shut down as of July 2025, administered certain TCB-related projects in support of AGOA, including funding African trade and investment hubs that work to increase AGOA utilization and regional producers’ access to international markets. The Trump Administration has emphasized “trade, not aid” as part of its Africa policy, and it remains to be seen whether it will support AGOA-related TCB through other initiatives. With a now Democratic-controlled Congress, perhaps the national legislature will restore such efforts to better enable U.S.-Africa trade.

While considering adjustments to AGOA, perhaps the incoming Congress will also help African Diaspora businesspeople in this country take better advantage of the program, something that has not been effectively attempted in its more than quarter century of existence. America’s African Diaspora is an untapped strength in competing with the rest of the world for commercial success in Africa, and we should not continue to waste this advantage. Here’s hoping the new Congress will take up this challenge.

Gregory Simpkins, a longtime specialist in African policy development, is the Principal of 21st Century Solutions. He consults with organizations on African policy issues generally, especially in relating to the U.S. Government. He is Editor-in-Chief of The Habari Network, the premier African Diaspora news website and moderates the Network’s podcast: Real Talk Habari.